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THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE: HOW IT
BRIEFLY LIVED, WHY IT DIED, AND WHY IT
DESPERATELY NEEDS REVIVAL IN
TODAY’S ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
MEAGHAN DUNIGAN†
INTRODUCTION
The nondelegation doctrine stands for the principle that the
United States Constitution places limits on the kind and
quantity of discretion that Congress can grant to other
government actors. For the last century, the nondelegation
doctrine has rarely been invoked to strike down congressional
delegation of legislative authority, as the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly deferred to Congress and administrative
agencies instead of upholding constitutional principles.1 The
current standard of review for nondelegation cases is the
“intelligible principle,” first articulated by the Supreme Court in
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.2 This standard
mandates that so long as Congress sets forth an “intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized . . . is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.”3 While the intelligible principle was initially
established as a means of upholding the constitutional roots of
nondelegation, decades of caselaw prove that this standard has
become a veiled attempt by the Supreme Court to uphold
congressional delegation not because it is consistent with
constitutional principles, but because the alternative—striking
†
J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. John’s University School of Law. Special thanks to
my dad, Byran Dunigan, for instilling in me a love of this Nation’s history and a
passion for justice.
1
See infra Section III.C. Only twice in the last century has the Supreme Court
struck down congressional delegation of power using the nondelegation doctrine,
both in the same year. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
2
276 U.S. 394 (1928).
3
Id. at 409.
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down delegation—is not a viable option given the size and scope
of today’s government, most notably the growth of administrative
agencies which have largely assumed the role of legislators.4
This Note addresses the flaws in the current intelligible
principle standard and proposes a new three-part standard that
would better revitalize the intelligible principle as it was first
articulated almost a century ago. This Note concedes that while
legislative delegation in any form is a violation of the original
meaning of the nondelegation doctrine,5 our society and the
growth of administrative agencies removed any chance of having
our laws created solely by Congress.6 What can happen, and
what this Note proposes, is for the Supreme Court to adopt a new
intelligible principle standard that scales back the amount of
authority being placed in the hands of those outside Capitol Hill.
Part I of this Note discusses the origins of congressional
delegation and the constitutional principles that underlie the
nondelegation doctrine. Part II discusses the creation of the
intelligible principle, from its inception in J.W. Hampton to
subsequent cases in the 1930’s that defined the standard’s limits.
Part III discusses the breakdown of the intelligible principle,
from the growth of administrative agencies to three significant
mistakes made by the Supreme Court that have effectively
rendered the standard meaningless. Finally, Part IV proposes a
new three-part intelligible principle standard; a standard that
recovers the original purpose of the nondelegation doctrine while
also adapting to the immense changes that our government
structure has undergone since the doctrine’s inception over 225
years ago.
I.

THE ROOTS OF NONDELEGATION

The Vesting Clause of the United States Constitution states
that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
While the meaning of
and House of Representatives.”7
“legislative power” has been the subject of scholarly debate,8 its
4

See infra Part III.
See infra Part I.
6
See infra note 96.
7
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
8
Scholars Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that the legislative power
referred to in the Article I Vesting Clause is the ability of legislators to vote for laws.
5
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general understanding comes from the father of the Federalist
Papers, Alexander Hamilton.9
Hamilton defined legislative
power as the power of making laws, or the right “to prescribe
Based on this
rules for the regulation of society.”10
understanding, the Article I Vesting Clause places the sole
authority of lawmaking in the hands of Congress; as a
consequence, the nondelegation doctrine holds Congress may not
delegate its lawmaking authority to any other branch. While
rooted in the Vesting Clause, the importance of the
nondelegation doctrine stems from two essential principles that
have stood as constitutional underpinnings—the accountability
of Congress to the people and the separation of powers doctrine.
A.

The Principles of Nondelegation

One of the most important functions of the nondelgation
doctrine is to maintain the accountability of the legislative
branch.11 This principle is perhaps best articulated in the Second
Treatise of Government, written by the seventeenth century
English philosopher John Locke.12 Locke believed the legislature
is “the supreme power” and that “no other person or
organisation . . . can make edicts that have the force of
law . . . unless they have been permitted to do this by the
legislature that the public has chosen and appointed.”13
Recognizing that the legislature derived its power from the
people, Locke believed there were four important things a
legislature could not do.14 Most notably, Locke believed the
As they see it, the nondelegation doctrine means that “[n]either Congress nor its
members may delegate to anyone else the authority to vote on federal statutes or to
exercise other de jure powers of federal legislators.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723
(2002).
9
See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 33, 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
10
THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
11
Justice Harlan saw the importance in accountability to the people as a
primary goal of nondelegation, writing that “it insures that the fundamental policy
decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official but by the body
immediately responsible to the people.” Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
12
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Jonathan Bennett ed.,
2008) (1689).
13
Id. at 134.
14
Id. at 135. The first limit was that the legislature cannot have arbitrary
power over the lives and fortunes of the people, but instead the rules they create
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legislature should not have the “power to transfer to anyone else
their authority to make laws.”15 Locke stressed the importance of
the derivative power of legislative authority, believing that if the
legislature were to give its lawmaking power to those outside the
legislature, it would move from a body that creates laws to one
that creates legislators.16 He proclaimed that if lawmaking
authority fell into the hands of those not elected by the people,
the legislature would not be held directly accountable for the
laws created. Therefore, if such laws were not well received by
the public, the legislature could simply pass the blame onto the
delegated parties. Locke felt that this type of delegation would
undermine the legislature’s function as the voice of the people
and destroy any accountability at the hands of the elected
officials.
Heavily influenced by Locke’s understanding of
government, the United States Constitution’s nondelegation
doctrine was intended to defend against this breakdown of
legislative accountability.
The second key principle of the nondelegation doctrine is to
uphold the separation of powers doctrine implicit in the United
States Constitution.17 James Madison stressed the importance of
the separation of powers doctrine, writing that “[t]he
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many . . . may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”18 If members of
the executive or judicial branch were allowed to take an active
role in lawmaking, it would raise questions about whether the
branches were intermingling in a way that jeopardizes the
separation of powers. The nondelegation doctrine was designed
to protect against this intermingling by prohibiting the

must conform to the laws of nature. Id. Second, the legislature cannot give itself
power to rule by sudden, arbitrary decrees, but instead it must govern according to
standing laws. Id. at 136. Third, the legislature cannot take any part of a man’s
property without his consent. Id. at 138.
15
Id. at 141.
16
Id.
17
The Constitution contains no provision expressly calling for the separation of
powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. However, the
Constitution has long been held to require the separation of powers as vital to
maintaining governmental order.
18
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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delegation of legislative authority, thereby ensuring that the
federal government would be unable to consolidate its power to
the detriment of its citizens.
B.

The Importance of Nondelegation

The principles of the nondelegation doctrine are vital not
only to upholding the Constitution, but also to ensuring that our
government functions as the republic the Nation’s forefather’s
intended.19 However, for decades, opponents of the doctrine have
argued that nondelegation simply is not a viable option in today’s
society.20 Some scholars argue that the nondelegation doctrine
has been misinterpreted from its inception, and that the
delegation of legislative authority is actually consistent with the
Constitution.21 Others argue that while the doctrine exists, its
revival would have no effect on improving the current
administrative state.22
This Note does not debate the merits of the nondelegation
doctrine. Instead, this Note accepts that the nondelegation
doctrine exists, and that the principles justifying it are essential
to upholding the values of the Constitution. However, what this
Note does seek to do is shed light on the deficiencies in the
current nondelegation standard. The United States Supreme
Court has increasingly allowed an intermingling of power
between the legislative and executive branch, which has
undermined both the principles of accountability and separation
of powers that nondelegation was designed to protect. As a
result, the nondelegation doctrine stands as an unenforceable

19
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (describing the difference between a republic and a democracy and how the
United States is a republic, which Madison defined as “the delegation of
government . . . to a small number of citizens elected by the rest”).
20
See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1694–97 (1975) (arguing that stricter enforcement of the
nondelegation doctrine would “clearly be unwise” because calling for more detailed
legislative specification of policies is “neither feasible nor desirable”); David B.
Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO.
L.J. 97 (2000) (arguing why public choice would support delegating legislative
authority to unelected agency officials).
21
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1723–25.
22
See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 321
(2000) (“[I]t is far from clear that a large-scale judicial revival of the nondelegation
doctrine would do anything to improve the operation of the regulatory state. It may
well make things worse, possibly much worse.”).
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doctrine, as the current intelligible principle standard is a
hollowed shell compared to its original inception. This Note
proposes a reformulation of the intelligible principle that both
upholds constitutional principles and ensures society can operate
given today’s complex government structure.
II. THE CREATION OF THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE
While the principles of nondelegation are rooted in ideals
that form the foundation of our republic, the unfortunate truth is
that the nondelegation doctrine began crumbling within two
decades of the ratification of the United States Constitution. As
a result, the intelligible principle was adopted to enforce the
decaying doctrine by ensuring that Congress was not delegating
its legislative authority in a manner inconsistent with the
Constitution.
However, over the past eighty years, the
intelligible principle has become a meaningless phrase used by
the United States Supreme Court to justify the delegation of
virtually unrestricted legislative authority to administrative
agencies.
Consequently, the current intelligible principle
standard is riddled with gaps that must be filled. In order to fill
these gaps, the first step is to trace how nondelegation took its
current shape.
A.

Conditional Legislation

The Supreme Court’s first nondelegation case was Cargo of
Brig Aurora v. United States,23 decided in 1813. After the
expiration of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, Congress passed
an updated version of the Act in 1811 that restricted trade with
France and Great Britain.24 The statute gave the President
authority to lift the trade embargo against either country if he
declared that the country had stopped violating the neutral
trading power of the United States.25 Challenged for giving the
President a role in the legislative process, the Court held that
this type of delegation to the President was permissible since it
was Congress, not the President, who actually created the law.26
The President’s role was simply to make the factual

23
24
25
26

11 U.S. 382 (1813).
Id. at 388.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 386.
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determination as to whether the law would go into effect. Known
as “conditional legislation,”27 this type of delegation became the
first standard by which nondelegation was measured.
In terms of upholding the principles of the nondelegation
doctrine, conditional legislation fell in line with keeping
accountability in the hands of Congress and maintaining the
separation of powers between Congress and the Executive.28 The
Court elaborated on conditional legislation as a means of
congressional delegation in 1892, when it decided Marshall Field
& Co. v. Clark.29 In Field, Congress passed the Tariff Act of
1890, known today as the McKinley Tariff, which authorized the
President to suspend those provisions of the Tariff Act that
permitted the free importation of goods if the President
determined that a country imposed duties that were “reciprocally
unequal and unreasonable.”30 Among other things, the Act was
challenged as granting the President impermissible legislative
authority.31 Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan stated:
The true distinction . . . is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.32

The Court held that the Act was a permissible delegation of
The Court reasoned that
authority to the President.33
“[l]egislative power was exercised when congress declared that
the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency,”
and that the President “was the mere agent of the law-making
department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its
expressed will was to take effect.”34 The Court’s holding,
combined with Justice Harlan’s examination into what
27
Also referred to as the “named contingency” test. See WILLIAM F. FUNK,
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND
PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 546–47 (5th ed. 2014).
28
See Justice Clarence Thomas’ concurring opinion in Department of
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, infra Section IV.B.
29
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
30
Id. at 680.
31
Id. at 681.
32
Id. at 693–94 (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v.
Comm’rs of Clinton Cty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 88–89 (1852)).
33
Id. at 690–91.
34
Id. at 693.

254

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:247

constitutes a permissible delegation, shows that the only
permissible authority Congress may grant the Executive is in the
form of conditional legislation, and not the delegation of pure
lawmaking.
While there is an argument to be made that the Field Court
extended conditional legislation beyond what the Court in Brig
Aurora had intended,35 Field remained outside the realm of
delegating pure legislative authority to the executive.
Nevertheless, heading into the twentieth century, the nature of
government was changing, beginning with the Interstate
Commerce Act of 188736 and the growth of the administrative
state under the New Deal.37 With the creation of agencies and
commissions that fell under the executive branch, Congress
began delegating more authority that pushed beyond conditional
legislation, paving the way for the Court to establish the
intelligible principle as the new standard to measure
congressional delegation.
B.

Birth of the Intelligible Principle

The intelligible principle was first articulated in J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,38 opening the door to a new
era of nondelegation jurisprudence. J.W. Hampton involved a
challenge to the so-called “flexible tariff provision” within the
Tariff Act of 1922.39 The provision authorized the President to fix
certain rates of goods if the President determined that the
current rates did not equal the difference between the cost of
production in the United States and foreign countries.40 To make
that determination, Congress laid out four considerations41 that
35
Unlike in Brig Aurora, which only authorized the President to determine
whether or not France or Great Britain stopped violating the neutral trading power
of the United States, the statute in Field was more discretionary because it allowed
the President to determine whether the duties levied by other countries were
“unequal and unreasonable.” This difference, though minor, is an important step to
understanding the current scope of congressional delegation and the intelligible
principle. See also Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV.
327, 362–65 (2002).
36
See David Casazza, Note, Liberty Requires Accountability: Checking
Delegations to Independent Agencies, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 729, 737 (2015).
37
See infra Part III, notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
38
276 U.S. 394 (1928).
39
Id. at 400.
40
Id. at 400–01.
41
The four considerations were:
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the President would use, and also mandated that the United
States Tariff Commission conduct an investigation before any
proclamation could be issued.42
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co challenged this provision, arguing
that it was an invalid delegation of legislative authority to the
President.43 The United States. Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision, held that the flexible tariff provision was a permissible
delegation of authority to the President.44 The Court found that
Congress had clearly defined a policy and plan, and the authority
given to the President was merely to determine differences in
rates to comply with that underlying policy and plan.45 The
Court did not view the President’s authority as an exercise of
delegation of legislative power. Instead, the Court viewed the
President’s authority as a means “to secure the exact effect
intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such
officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and
directing the details of its execution . . . .”46 Based on this
analysis, Justice Taft concluded that “[i]f Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized [to act] is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power.”47
Based on the Court’s rationale, the intelligible principle
requires Congress to clearly articulate a “policy and plan” and
allows Congress to grant the executive the authority to execute
that plan upon consideration of various factors.
While
theoretically the intelligible principle seems to align with
conditional legislation because it empowers the executive to

(1) the differences in conditions in production, including wages, costs of
material, and other items in costs of production of such or similar articles
in the United States and in competing foreign countries; (2) the differences
in the wholesale selling prices of domestic and foreign articles in the
principal markets of the United States; (3) advantages granted to a foreign
producer by a foreign government, or by a person, partnership, corporation,
or association in a foreign country; and (4) any other advantages or
disadvantages in competition.
Id. at 401–02.
42
Id. at 402.
43
Id. at 404.
44
Id. at 410–11.
45
Id. at 404–05.
46
Id. at 406.
47
Id. at 409.
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implement a plan already established by Congress; in reality, the
intelligible principle, as it was first articulated, actually
permitted Congress to delegate purely legislative power.48
Unlike in Field, where the President was only making a factual
determination as to whether certain goods should have rates that
were already prescribed by Congress, in J.W. Hampton, the
President was not only determining whether current rates were
unequal, but also what those rates should be.49 While the Court
itself maintained that the President’s action was the mere
execution of an existing statute, the Court went on to state that
“[i]f Congress were to be required to fix every rate, it would be
impossible to exercise the power at all.”50 This suggests that, for
practical reasons, the Court will allow Congress to delegate
legislative authority to the executive. Therefore, the main
purpose in establishing the intelligible principle was to ensure
that such delegation was not too excessive.
C.

Shaping the Limits of the Intelligible Principle

In the decade following J.W. Hampton, the Supreme Court
decided two important nondelegation cases that solidified the
intelligible principle as the standard to measure congressional
delegation and helped define the standard’s limits. In Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan,51 the Court struck down a provision of the
National Industry Recovery Act (“Recovery Act”) in which
Congress authorized the President to prohibit the transportation
of petroleum products.52 In striking down the provision, the
Court pointed out three criteria to be considered when
determining whether there has been an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority: “whether the Congress has declared a policy
with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a
standard for the President’s action; [and] whether the Congress
has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the

48
The Court’s biggest failure in J.W. Hampton was that it viewed the
President’s action as mere execution of an existing statute guided by an intelligible
principle, when in reality it was granting the President the power to make laws.
49
See Lawson, supra note 35, at 367–68.
50
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 407.
51
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
52
Id. at 405.
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authority to enact the prohibition.” The Court went on to find
that none of the three criteria existed in the Recovery Act
provision.53
First, the Court determined that Congress did not lay out a
policy initiative with respect to transporting petroleum, but
instead gave the President “unlimited authority to determine the
policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he
may see fit.”54 Second, the Court found that the provision
“establishes no creterion [sic] to govern the President’s course.”55
Third, the Court determined that the provision required no
“finding by the President as a condition of his action.”56 As a
result, the Court struck down the provision as an impermissible
delegation of legislative authority.57
The three-part standard articulated in Panama Refining
Co.—although not explicitly stated by the Court as a three-part
standard—gave meaningful boundaries to the intelligible
principle beyond what was first articulated in J.W. Hampton.
Not only does Congress need to set forth a policy and plan to
which the President’s actions must conform, but Congress must
also mandate that a certain condition exists before the President
can take action. The impact of grafting conditional legislation
into the intelligible principle was significant because it
strengthened the constitutionality of the standard by ensuring
that the President would not have the sole ability to create laws
at his discretion, thus promoting both legislative accountability
and the separation of powers.
Four months after Panama Refining Co., the Court struck
down a second provision of the Recovery Act in A.L.A. Schechter
The provision at issue
Poultry Corp. v. United States.58
authorized the President to approve codes of “fair competition”
among trade and industry associations after making a
determination that the suggested codes “impose[d] no inequitable
restrictions on admission to membership and [we]re truly
Additionally, the provision allowed the
representative.”59
President to impose conditions that he “deem[ed] necessary to
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 430.
295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
Id. at 538.
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effectuate the policy herein declared.”60 The Court held that this
provision was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
because “the discretion of the President in approving or
prescribing codes . . . [wa]s virtually unfettered.”61 While the
provision seemingly invoked conditional legislation by requiring
the President to make certain findings about the codes before
approving them, the Court found that the provision “supplie[d]
no standards”62 and any restrictions left “virtually untouched the
field of policy” that was envisioned by the underlying statute,
making the President’s findings “really but a statement of an
opinion.”63
Again, the Court did not directly invoke the intelligible
principle when striking down the provision in A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry. However, the Court compared the flexible tariff
provision in J.W. Hampton with the Recovery Act provision in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, stating how the provision in J.W.
Hampton clearly limited the delegation of legislative power,
while the provision in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry supplied no
standards for the President’s “legislative undertaking.”64
Drawing upon J.W. Hampton and Panama Refining Co., the
Court provided more insight into what it considers when
determining whether there is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.65 As in Panama Refining Co., the Court
referenced conditional legislation when it noted that the
President’s ability to approve codes could only occur after he
determined the codes were fair.66 However, the Court found
issue with this type of conditional legislation because the
President was not making a factual determination, but rather a
discretionary finding, as the term “fair” has no real measurable
bounds.67 Additionally, the Court’s holding called for Congress to
60
Id. at 523. The policy goals of the Recovery Act were the rehabilitation,
correction, and expansion of trades and industries, and only one specifically called
for the Act “to eliminate unfair competitive practices . . . .” Id. at 535.
61
Id. at 542.
62
Id. at 541.
63
Id. at 538.
64
Id. at 541–42.
65
Id. at 537–38.
66
Id. at 538–39.
67
Id. Compared to the conditional legislation in Brig Aurora and Field, the
discretionary finding that needed to occur before the President could approve the
codes in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry could not be measured by a numerical standard or
a clear determination of whether a violation of an existing statute occurred.
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articulate clear standards by which the President is to exercise
his delegated authority, and that any delegation of authority that
extended beyond the policy goals underlying the statute was
impermissible.68
Both Panama Refining Co. and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
provide meaningful insight into the intelligible principle.
Unfortunately, this insight has largely been dismissed based on
the notion that the Court struck down congressional delegation
in the 1930’s solely because of the tension that existed between
the Court and President Roosevelt.69 The fact that the Court has
not invalidated a statute as an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority to the executive branch since 1935 largely
supports this assertion.70 Instead, the Court has repeatedly
stretched the meaning of the intelligible principle beyond what
was originally defined in J.W. Hampton, Panama Refining Co.,
and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, taking the life out of nondelegation
jurisprudence.

68
The Court found that the policy goals were too broad and gave no direction to
the President when determining whether or not to approve the codes. Id. 534–35.
69
See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It
Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1237 n.86 (1985); FUNK, SHAPIRO & WEAVER,
supra note 27, at 549–50 (discussing that although President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s infamous Court Packing Plan to alter the composition of the Court was
unsuccessful, “it is widely viewed as prompting a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence
on a variety of issues,” including the Court’s adoption of a “more expansive position
regarding Congress’ power to delegate authority”).
70
However, the Court did strike down a delegation of legislative authority to
private entities in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278 (1936). In Carter
Coal, Congress passed the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, which established a
commission to create new competition standards. Id. at 310–11. Members of the
commission were selected based on the amount of coal they produced in relation to
the national average. Id. at 281–82. The Supreme Court held that Congress’
delegation of authority to the commission was unconstitutional because it conferred
power not to an official body “but to private persons whose interests may be and
often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.” Id. at 311. While
the Court struck down the delegation by citing to the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, the nondelegation doctrine loomed largely in the background of the
decision, with the Court calling Congress’ actions “legislative delegation in its most
obnoxious form.” Id. The nondelegation doctrine in relation to private entities still
remains a pillar of the original understanding of the doctrine: that Congress may not
delegate any legislative authority.
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III. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE
At the time J.W. Hampton was decided, the United Sates
was just eighteen months away from the Stock Market Crash of
1929, the beginning of the Great Depression, and FDR’s New
Deal.71 These events signaled a change in the government’s role
in regulating society and played a large role in why the
intelligible principle was so short-lived as an enforced standard
of nondelegation jurisprudence.
Most notably, there was a massive growth of administrative
agencies that fell under the authority of the executive branch
during the New Deal.72 Administrative agencies undertake
various policy and lawmaking functions that were once reserved
for the legislature, adding an additional layer of bureaucracy
between Congress, who enacts a statute, and the President to
whom the statute delegates the authority. This additional layer
undermines one of the key purposes of the nondelegation
However, while the
doctrine: maintaining accountability.73
growth of administrative agencies posed a serious threat to the
nondelegation doctrine and its purposes, neither Congress nor
the United States Supreme Court actively sought to uphold the
doctrine and follow the intelligible principle. Instead, Congress
began delegating large quantities of legislative authority to
administrative agencies, and the Court repeatedly upheld these
delegations under the guise of the intelligible principle.74 In

71
The Stock Market Crash of 1929 occurred on October 4, 1929 and J.W.
Hampton was decided on April 9, 1928.
72
See Casazza, supra note 36, at 737 n.43.
73
In his Note, Liberty Requires Accountability: Checking Delegations to
Independent Agencies, David Casazza discusses extensively the political
accountability issue with administrative agencies. In the context of nondelegation,
Casazza writes that “[t]he commitment to nondelegation proceeds from the people's
decision to place political power in the legislature. . . . When Congress delegates its
policymaking power to an agency, the power of making laws passes out of the hands
of those to whom the people have entrusted it.” Id. at 737, 742, 746.
74
There are cases in which the Court does not explicitly cite to the intelligible
principle when discussing nondelegation but, based on the cases the Court cites to in
determining whether there has a permissible delegation, it becomes apparent that
the intelligible principle is being invoked. See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-American
Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218–19 (1989) (referring to Mistretta v. United States and
American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission to define the
nondelegation doctrine and its principles); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referencing Touby v. United States and
American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission when discussing
the Court upholding delegations under broad terms).
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particular, there have been three major ways in which the Court
has contributed to the breakdown of the intelligible principle.
First, the Court upheld broad policy objectives and unlimited
authority.75 Second, the Court inaccurately rearticulated the
intelligible principle in Mistretta v. United States,76 and revived
the standard in a manner inconsistent with the original meaning.
Third, the Court removed the requirement of conditional
legislation as a requirement of the intelligible principle.77 In
turn, a series of nondelegation cases illustrate that, as the
decades progressed, the Court became more lax in its application
of the intelligible principle, ultimately leading to the breakdown
of the intelligible principle as a meaningful standard to measure
congressional delegation.
A.

Upholding Broad Policy Objectives and Boundless Agency
Authority

The Supreme Court’s first misstep in its application of the
intelligible principle came just seven years after it struck down
congressional delegation in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry.
In
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,78 the Court examined
the authority delegated to the Communications Commission in
the Communications Act of 1934.
The Communications
Commission was authorized to adopt regulations for radio
broadcasting “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
th[e] Act,”79 namely to create regulations that were in the “public
interest, convenience, or necessity.”80 The Court held that this
“public interest” policy objective was “a criterion which ‘is as
concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of
delegated authority permit.’ ”81 This newly-created public

75
See generally Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90
(1946).
76
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
77
See infra Section III.C.
78
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
79
Id. at 217.
80
Id. at 193–94.
81
Id. at 216 (quoting Fed. Commc’ns Comm. v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S.
134, 138 (1940)).
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interest standard, while seemingly ambiguous, was upheld in
various forms as a sufficient policy objective under the
intelligible principle.82
Then in Yakus v. United States,83 the Court upheld the
Emergency Price Control Act during World War II, which created
the Office of Price Administration headed by a presidentiallyappointed Price Administrator.84 The Act stated that the Price
Administrator was to establish “fair and equitable” prices that
reflected the Act’s purpose as a wartime measure to stabilize
prices.85 The Court found the Act to be a permissible delegation
of legislative power because Congress “stated the legislative
objective, . . . prescribed the method of achieving that objective—
maximum price fixing—and . . . laid down standards to guide the
administrative determination of both the occasions for the
exercise of the price-fixing power, and the particular prices to be
established.”86 While stabilizing wartime prices was a narrower
policy objective than the public interest standard, the Price
Administrator had broad discretion on how to reach that
objective. Establishing “fair and equitable” prices is similarly
broad compared to creating “codes of fair competition,” language
that the Court struck down for being too discretionary in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry. This contrary result in Yakus demonstrates
the Court was moving away from its original understanding of
the intelligible principle and allowing Congress to delegate more
authority to administrative agencies.
Another example of broad congressional delegation is found
in American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange
Commission.87 There, Congress passed the Public Utility Holding
Company Act, giving the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) the authority to ensure that the holding company system
did not “‘unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure’ or
82
See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co. 320 U.S. 591, 611 (1944)
(upholding delegation to the Federal Power Commission to fix “just and reasonable
rates” for natural gas prices that were “consistent with the maintenance of adequate
service in the public interest”); Fed. Commc’ns Comm. v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309
U.S. 134, 137–38 (1940) (upholding the Communications Commission’s authority to
create a regulatory system that grants or denies licenses based on “public
convenience, interest or necessity”).
83
321 U.S. 414 (1944).
84
Id. at 419.
85
Id. at 420.
86
Id. at 423.
87
329 U.S. 90 (1946).
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‘unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security
holders.’ ”88 These phrases were challenged as impermissible
delegations for being undefined and having no meaning.89 The
Court upheld these phrases as sufficient delegations, and in
doing so articulated what seemed to be a new standard for the
intelligible principle. The Court stated that delegations of
legislative authority were sufficient so long as Congress laid out
(1) a general policy, (2) “the public agency which is to apply” the
policy, and (3) “the boundaries of this delegated authority.”90 As
in Yakus, the Court found that the terms “unfair and
inequitable” were sufficient boundaries by which the SEC could
implement regulations.91 In American Power & Light Co., the
Court justified such broad discretionary terms by stating that the
terms “reflect[] . . . the necessities of modern legislation dealing
with complex economic and societal problems.”92
This
justification illustrated how the Court recognized that it was not
staying true to the original meaning of the intelligible principle,
an unfortunate mistake that had an immense impact on
nondelegation jurisprudence.
The Court’s decisions in National Broadcasting Co., Yakus,
and American Power & Light Co. stripped the intelligible
principle so far down that within two decades of its creation the
standard had lost its original meaning. Subsequent courts rarely
even invoked the words “intelligible principle,” and those that did
often cited to the standards set forth in American Power & Light
Co. to determine whether the delegation satisfied the intelligible
principle.93 While it is not clear that the J.W. Hampton Court
demanded that Congress articulate a specific “policy and plan,”
the Court’s subsequent use of the intelligible principle to strike
88

Id. at 104.
Id.
90
Id. at 105.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (using National
Broadcasting Co. as its standard and admitting that the Court has upheld
“delegations under standards phrased in sweeping terms”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 720 (1986) (using Yakus as a standard); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v.
Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing
American Power & Light Co. and the broad policy objectives upheld by the Court);
Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 560 (1976); Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) (citing American Power & Light Co. in
discussing how the Court should interpret the standards set forth by Congress).
89
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down delegations in Panama Refining Co. and A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry because they were too discretionary demonstrates that
specificity was a required element of the original intelligible
principle. Therefore, the Court’s upholding of broad policy
objectives and boundless agency authority is a major contribution
to the breakdown of the intelligible principle for several reasons.
First, how the Court could repeatedly come to the conclusion
that the phrase “public interest” is a concrete policy objective to
guide an agency is something that puzzled even Justice Scalia,
who, in his dissenting opinion in Mistretta v. United States, posed
the question: “What legislated standard, one must wonder, can
possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have
repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a ‘public interest’
standard?”94 This standard has effectively allowed Congress to
grant administrative agencies the authority to create any rules
they deem to be in the public interest, solely relying on the
agency’s own views and policy agenda rather than requiring
Congress to set forth objective guidelines.
A second problem with the Court upholding broad policy
objectives and delegations that give unlimited amounts of
legislative authority to agencies is the manner in which the
Court justifies its decisions. The Court never upholds phrases
such as “public interest,” “just and reasonable rates,” “unfair
methods of competition,” or “relevant factors” by showing how
and why these broad terms are consistent with the original
meaning of the intelligible principle or the nondelegation
doctrine. Instead, the Court simply states that because the
Court has upheld similarly broad phrases in the past, the current
delegation should also survive a nondelegation challenge.95
Additionally, the Court justifies these broad standards by
blaming the state of society; namely, the growth of the
administrative state.96 While this may be a legitimate argument

94

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id., 488 U.S. at 374 (majority opinion) (“In light of our approval of these
broad delegations, we harbor no doubt that Congress’ delegation of authority to the
Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional
requirements.”); Loving, 517 U.S. at 771 (admitting that since 1935 “we have since
upheld, without exception, delegations under standards phrased in sweeping
terms”).
96
See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (“[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a
practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an
95
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in favor of giving administrative agencies more legislative
authority, it does not justify the breadth of authority that the
Court has upheld under the nondelegation doctrine. In fact, an
argument can be made that the growth of today’s administrative
state is in part a result of the Court upholding broad delegations
to agencies by Congress, enabling the creation of more agencies
to relieve Congress of its duties in favor of bureaucrats.
Therefore, the Court’s upholding of broad policy objectives and
unlimited boundaries of agency authority was a major
contribution to the breakdown of the intelligible principle
because it allowed agencies to exercise too much discretion and
repudiated the original understanding of the intelligible
principle.
B.

The Inaccurate Rearticulation of the Intelligible Principle

The second way the Court contributed to the breakdown of
the intelligible principle was by adopting the three requirements
outlined in American Power & Light Co. as the intelligible
principle standard in Mistretta v. United States.97 In Mistretta,
the Court had to determine whether Congress delegated
excessive authority to the United States Sentencing Commission
in tasking the agency with creation of new sentencing
guidelines.98 In the underlying statute, “Congress charged the
[Sentencing] Commission with three goals . . . specified four
‘purposes’ of sentencing that the Commission must pursue in
carrying out its mandate” and “prescribed the specific tool—the
guidelines system—for the Commission to use in regulating
sentencing.”99 The Court held that the goals and standards
articulated by the statute satisfied the intelligible principle.100 In
describing the requirements of the intelligible principle, the

ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258, 274 (1967) (“Delegation of power under general directives is an
inevitable consequence of our complex society, with its myriad, ever changing, highly
technical problems.”); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of Wage and Hour Div. of
Dep’t of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941) (“In an increasingly complex society
Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all the
facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative
policy . . . .”).
97
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372–73.
98
Id. at 370.
99
Id. at 374.
100
Id. at 371–74.
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Court quoted its decision in American Power & Light Co., stating
that it is “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates
the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the
boundaries of this delegated authority.”101
Following Mistretta, the Court continued to uphold
congressional delegations under the broad terms of American
Power & Light Co. In Touby v. United States,102 Congress
authorized the Attorney General to classify various drugs as
controlled substances for purposes of criminal drug enforcement
if doing so was “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the
public safety.”103 The Court upheld this standard as being
consistent with the intelligible principle by pointing out the
Court’s history of upholding delegations of authority to establish
“fair and equitable” prices or rules in the “public interest.”104 “In
light of these precedents,” the Court declared, “one cannot
plausibly argue that [the statute]’s ‘imminent hazard to the
public safety’ standard is not an intelligible principle.”105 Ten
years later, the Court decided Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns,106 which was an important case in nondelegation
jurisprudence because it was the first time Justice Thomas
articulated his concerns about whether the intelligible principle
is an appropriate standard to measure congressional
delegation.107 Whitman involved a challenge to a provision of the
Clean Air Act, which authorized the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) to create air quality standards at a level
“requisite to protect the public health.”108 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals previously held that the provision
was an unconstitutional delegation of authority because
101
Id. at 372–73 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105
(1946)). Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter, criticized, among other things, the Court’s
repeated upholding of the public interest standard as a sufficient policy objective. Id.
at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102
500 U.S. 160 (1991).
103
Id. at 162–63.
104
Id. at 165 (first citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426–27 (1944);
and then citing Nat’l Broad. Co., v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943)).
105
Id.
106
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
107
See id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am not convinced that the
intelligible principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative
power. . . . On a future day, however, I would be willing to address the question
whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’
understanding of separation of powers.”).
108
Id. at 465 (majority opinion).
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Congress had failed to set forth an intelligible principle.109
However, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the term
“requisite” meant “sufficient, but not more than necessary,” and
holding that the scope of discretion was a permissible delegation
under various nondelegation precedents.110
The Court’s rearticulation of the intelligible principle in
Mistretta, using the requirements from American Power & Light
Co., was a major contribution to the breakdown of the intelligible
principle because it completely removed the original meaning of
the intelligible principle that was developed by J.W. Hampton,
Panama Refining Co., and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry.
By
solidifying general policy objectives as a requirement of the
intelligible principle, the Court gave administrative agencies the
ability to define the scope of these objectives with virtually no
pushback.
Additionally, while the third requirement from
American Power & Light Co. calls for Congress to delineate
boundaries of authority, the subsequent case law following
Mistretta illustrates that Congress did not actually need to
include quantifiable boundaries.111 In both Touby and Whitman,
the Court upheld the terms “necessary” and “requisite” as
sufficient limits on authority as both are extremely discretionary
terms that do not give agencies any real guidance.
Additionally, the rearticulation of the intelligible principle in
Mistretta occurred four years after the Court adopted its policy of
For the
Chevron deference to administrative agencies.112
purposes of this Note, the Chevron doctrine can be simplified into
the idea of administrative deference when Congress is silent or
ambiguous on an issue within a statute.113 When this occurs,
109
Id. at 472. The D.C. Court of Appeals determined that the provision “failed to
state intelligibly how much is too much.” Id. (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
110
Id. at 472–74.
111
See id.; see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
112
The doctrine is named after Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court held that the
Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the term “stationary source”
was reasonable in the absence of an explicit definition from Congress. Id. at 840–41,
865–66. The Court reached its conclusion by creating a two-step analysis of an
agency’s interpretation of a statute. Id. at 842–43. The first step is to determine
whether a statute is ambiguous. Id. If it is, then the second step is to determine
whether the agency’s interpretation of that statute is reasonable. Id. at 843. This
analysis rests on a presumption that courts should defer to the agency’s
interpretation instead of creating their own. Id. at 844.
113
Id. at 844–45.
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courts defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute so long
as it is reasonable, instead of substituting their own
interpretation of the statue.114 There are many constitutional
and administrative law issues associated with Chevron that are
beyond the scope of this Note. However, Chevron deference is
important because it has allowed administrative agencies to
change policy goals articulated by Congress.115 Combined with
Mistretta’s lax rearticualtion of the intelligible principle, the
Court has allowed administrative agencies to assume
tremendous discretion and authority when promulgating laws,
thus eliminating congressional accountability and raising
concerns over separation of powers.
The Court’s rearticulation and subsequent application of the
intelligible principle in Mistretta shows that the intelligible
principle is a dead standard for nondelegation jurisprudence. In
fact, since Whitman, the Court has been virtually silent on the
issue of congressional delegations.116 It was not until the Court’s
2015 decision in Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of
American Railroads117 that the nondelegation doctrine
resurfaced, in large part due to a lengthy concurrence by Justice
Thomas.118 In Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American
Railroads, the Association challenged Congress’ delegation of
authority to Amtrak to issue “metrics and standards” that
address the performance and scheduling of passenger railroad
services.119 The Association argued that because Amtrak was a
private entity any congressional delegation to Amtrak was
unconstitutional,120 but the Court concluded that Amtrak was a
government entity.121 However, instead of then determining

114

Id. at 843.
See Schoenbrod, supra note 69, at 1242–43.
116
From Whitman to the present, the Court has mentioned either nondelegation
or the intelligible principle in only nine cases, none of them ruling on a delegation
challenge. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2015) (Alito, J.,
dissenting); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015);
Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 438 (2012); Sykes v. United States, 564
U.S. 1, 15–16 (2011), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015);
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 56 (2011);
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 842–43 (2010).
117
135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).
118
See id. at 1240–52 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119
Id. at 1228 (majority opinion).
120
Id.
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Id.
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whether the statute granting Amtrak the authority to issue
“metrics and standards” was a permissible delegation of
authority, the Court remanded the case because the Court of
Appeals had not ruled on the issue, thereby avoiding the
opportunity to evaluate the merits of nondelegation and its
application.122
C.

The Disappearance of Conditional Legislation

Finally, the third way the United States Supreme Court
contributed to the breakdown of the intelligible principle was its
retreat from conditional legislation as a factor in measuring
congressional delegation. Since A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, there
has been no call by the Court in nondelegation cases for agencies
to satisfy some prerequisite before they can begin promulgating
rules.123 Instead, the Court has allowed Congress to delegate
purely legislative authority to agencies without first requiring
that the agencies make some type of factual determination.
As discussed earlier, J.W. Hampton did delegate legislative
power to the President by allowing him to fix new tariff rates,
even though the Court viewed this as simply executing Congress’
policy and plan.124 However, in J.W. Hampton, the President had
to determine whether the differences in the current rates were
unequal, and only then could he fix new rates as he deemed
necessary.125 This factual determination as a prerequisite to the
President exercising legislative authority was a type of
conditional legislation, and in both Panama Refining Co. and
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, the Court referenced the fact that
conditional legislation should be included when Congress is

122

Id.
Only Justice Thomas has expressed such desire in his concurring opinion in
Department of Transportation. Id. at 1246–48 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Clinton v.
City of New York, the government argued that the Line Item Veto was contingent
legislation similar to the conditional legislation in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649 (1892). 524 U.S. 417, 442–45 (1998). The Court rejected this argument,
concluding that the issue in the case was not a question of permissible delegation
but rather that the Line Item Veto violated Article I, § 7. Id. at 444. However,
Justice Breyer argued that the Line Item Veto was constitutional and that the
“power the Act grants the President to prevent spending items from taking effect
does not violate the ‘nondelegation’ doctrine.” Id. at 490 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124
See supra Section II.B.
125
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405–06 (1928).
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delegating its authority.126 Unfortunately, by abandoning this
requirement, the Court weakened the intelligible principle by
making it easier for Congress to delegate purely legislative—and
virtually unrestricted—authority. This is a major failure of the
Court because it undermines the separation of powers, which is
one of the essential principles of nondelegation.
The Court’s upholding of broad policy objectives and
boundless agency authority, combined with its inaccurate
rearticualtion of the intelligible principle in Mistretta and the
removal of conditional legislation all greatly contributed to the
breakdown of the intelligible principle.
While today the
intelligible principle is largely dead, a reformulation of the
standard can breathe life into nondelegation and bring the
doctrine back to its constitutional roots.
IV. THE NEW-OLD INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE
The original intelligible principle test under J.W. Hampton,
Panama Refining Co., and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry required the
United States Supreme Court to look for three factors to
determine whether Congress permissibly delegated authority to
the executive branch: (1) a detailed policy objective in the
underlying statute; (2) a plan by which the executive was to carry
out that objective; and (3) a finding made by the executive prior
to using his delegated authority.127 Over the last eighty years,
these factors have collapsed, moving from a detailed policy and
plan to a general one and removing any type of conditional
legislation. The new standard proposed in this Note draws
mainly on the original understanding of the intelligible principle,
which is why the standard keeps the name “intelligible principle”
instead of fashioning a new term to measure congressional
delegation.
This new standard varies from the original
intelligible principle because it acknowledges the changes in
regards to both the size and scope of the government since the
1930’s, namely administrative agencies, and therefore attempts
to strike a balance by reviving the doctrine in a modern form.
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Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935).
127
Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 415; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at
541–42; J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 405–06.
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New Three-Part Standard

The new intelligible principle standard can be broken down
into three requirements: (1) specific policy objectives;
(2) conditional legislation; and (3) measurable boundaries of
authority.
Each requirement draws on the original
interpretation of the intelligible principle from J.W. Hampton,
Panama Refining Co., and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry and attempts
to bring back the original understanding of the nondelegation
doctrine.
1.

Specific Policy Objectives

The first requirement for the new intelligible principle is
that Congress must articulate specific policy objectives. This
would directly overrule the current standard from Mistretta,
which only calls for Congress to provide a general policy. A
specific policy objective would require Congress to clearly state a
goal that the delegated agency is to accomplish, which cannot be
subject to multiple interpretations. For example, the public
interest standard would not survive this requirement, because it
is too broad and can be easily manipulated by the agency
exercising the authority to promulgate rules to meet that
objective. Similarly, the “public health” and “public safety”
objectives from Whitman and Touby would also fail under this
requirement for being too ambiguous. However, in Mistretta, the
Sentencing Commission’s objective was not only to create
guidelines consistent with the purposes of sentencing,128 but also
to provide certainty and fairness in sentencing to avoid
disparities among similar defendants and crimes committed.129
These two objectives would meet the specificity requirement
because it is possible to determine whether the Commission has
met these objectives by looking to the sentencing data itself to
determine fairness rather than having the Commission speculate
on what it considers to be fair.
2.

Conditional Legislation

The second requirement is a variation on conditional
legislation that was the standard of nondelegation in early cases.
This requirement calls on Congress to have administrative
128
129

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2012).
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agencies make some type of factual determination about an issue
before it can begin to promulgate rules. This is a variation on
conditional legislation because it is not suggesting that Congress
has to create every rule and only use agencies to execute those
rules. Instead, it acknowledges that in today’s society it would be
impossible for Congress to create every rule, and so it authorizes
agencies to exercise legislative authority.
However, as a
prerequisite to exercising that legislative authority, Congress
must build into the statute some type of condition that will
trigger the agency’s authority.
This trigger could, like in J.W. Hampton, allow an agency to
promulgate rules after it determines that a current practice is
unequal or is contrary to a known and measurable policy
objective.
The type of determination required may be
discretionary, but it would nonetheless be rooted in some type of
factual basis to justify an agency’s decision. For example, in
Field, the factual determination the President had to make was
whether certain countries imposed duties that were “reciprocally
While “unreasonable” is a
unequal and unreasonable.”130
discretionary term, “unequal” is a fixed standard, and therefore
the President could only suspend free importation if a foreign
country’s duties were not equal to the duties in the United
States.131 Requiring this type of conditional legislation as a
prerequisite will serve as a barrier, preventing an agency from
using its delegated authority in situations where it is not
warranted, and ensures that it is Congress’ underlying authority
that controls the agency’s ability to exercise any legislative
function.
3.

Measurable Boundaries of Agency Authority

The third requirement pulls on a variety of factors to
determine whether Congress has provided sufficient boundaries
of authority that the agencies are confined to. Like the first
requirement calling for specificity, a requirement of measurable
boundaries of authority means that Congress cannot leave an
agency unfettered discretion in achieving its policy objectives.
For example, in Mistretta, Congress provided the Sentencing
Commission various factors it needed to consider to create the

130
131

Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892).
Id.
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sentencing guidelines, and even provided a guideline system that
the Commission needed to conform to.132 This satisfies the
requirement because the Court can easily determine whether the
Commission exceeded its delegated authority. For example, the
Commission would be found to have exceeded its authority if it
considered factors outside those articulated by Congress, or if it
did not conform to the guideline system provided.133 In contrast,
the statute at issue in Whitman would fail this requirement—in
addition to failing the first requirement—because the boundary
of achieving its goal of protecting the public health was at a level
the agency deemed “requisite,” which is a highly subjective and
limitless standard.134 The Court would not be able to determine
whether the EPA exceeded its delegated authority and therefore
would find that Congress did not articulate a clearly defined
boundary of authority.
Because providing measurable bounds of authority could
itself be considered a flexible standard, the Court must consider
two factors that would narrow the scope of Congress’ delegable
authority thereby increasing Congress’ responsibility to ensure
that its statutes do not delegate unrestricted authority to
agencies. First, the Court must consider whether Congress has
mandated part of the agency’s daily operations. Mandating daily
operations requires Congress to carefully examine agency
functions and removes agency discretion in favor of statutory
requirements. An example of such action can be found in
Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, in
which the Court found that Congress had mandated aspects of
Amtrak’s day-to-day operations in its underlying statute by
132

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374–76 (1989).
Under the new intelligible principle standard, Mistretta would survive a
nondelegation challenge on the issue of whether Congress sufficiently prescribed the
limits of the Sentencing Commission’s authority. However, there is a separate issue,
discussed Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, that Congress’ delegation to the
Sentencing Commission was unconstitutional because it created a “junior-varsity
Congress” within the judicial branch. Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On this
issue, Mistretta may not survive a delegation challenge because delegating
legislative authority to the judiciary is a clear violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. For the purposes of this Note, Mistretta is used as an example of how
Congress could satisfy the new intelligible principle irrespective of the separation of
powers issue. Had Congress delegated the authority to create new sentencing
guidelines to the Department of Justice or another administrative agency within the
executive branch, then Congress clearly would have been within its authority to
delegate.
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Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473–74 (2001).
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requiring Amtrak to maintain certain transportation routes.135
Requiring Congress to mandate an agency’s daily functions is an
important addition to the intelligible principle because it places
greater restrictions on an agency’s legislative authority by
removing some of that power and simultaneously increases
congressional oversight and accountability.
Second, when the Court has to consider whether an agency
acted in accordance with its delegated authority in the context of
Chevron deference, the Court should reject the presumption of
administrative deference that has allowed agencies to exercise
immense discretion when promulgating rules. Under this new
standard, when Congress has not explicitly delegated authority
to an agency on a particular issue, the Court should not engage
in determining whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute
is a reasonable one as it currently does under Chevron. Instead,
the Court should rule that Congress did not intend the agency to
exercise authority on that issue. Requiring the Court to find
against administrative deference will put pressure on Congress
to explicitly state an agency’s boundary of authority. If Congress
fails to do so, then the agency cannot exercise that authority and
Congress must amend the statute or provide some other
alternative if it wishes the agency to have such authority.136
While this new three-part intelligible principle strays from
the original meaning of nondelegation, it strays out of necessity
and not out of blindness. The goal of this new intelligible
principle is to hold Congress to a higher standard and ensure
that any delegation of legislative authority to administrative
agencies is as close to the original intelligible principle as
possible, while accounting for the dramatic changes to our
governmental structure. Under this new standard, agencies will
have more direction and focus when promulgating rules.
Additionally, because Congress will be responsible for giving

135

Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232 (2015).
The applicability of Chevron deference was recently questioned in King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). In determining that Congress did not intend for the
Internal Revenue Service to have authority in crafting health insurance policies, the
Court first noted that “[i]n extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” Id. at
2488–89 (citation omitted). The Court then suggested that deference to
administrative agencies may not apply in “question[s] of deep ‘economic and political
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detailed objectives and guidelines to the agencies, it will be easier
to hold Congress accountable if the rules fail or have adverse
effects on the public.
B.

How the New Intelligible Principle is Different from Other
Proposals for Nondelegation Reform

The intelligible principle has been around for almost a
century, and as a result there have been many attempts to revive
the standard and reform nondelegation jurisprudence. However,
none of the proposed reforms address the congressional
delegations with the breadth that this new three-part standard
proposes. For example, in his concurring opinion in Department
of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, Justice Thomas
advocated a “return to the original understanding of the federal
legislative power [to] require that the Federal Government create
generally applicable rules of private conduct only through the
constitutionally prescribed legislative process.”137 To Justice
Thomas’ displeasure, Congress cannot by itself make all of the
rules and regulations and only delegate authority to agencies to
execute those rules. That is impractical today and would shut
down the government, a fact that the Court has repeatedly
realized throughout nondelegation jurisprudence.138 The simple
truth is that administrative agencies are needed to promulgate
rules, but that does not mean agencies should have unlimited
discretion in the quality and quantity of rules they develop,
which is what the current intelligible principle allows. The
second requirement of the new intelligible principle addresses
this through conditional legislation from a modern perspective.
Recognizing that delegation of legislative authority has existed
since J.W. Hampton, the standard requires agencies exercising
such authority to make some type of factual—and likely semidiscretionary—determination before it can begin promulgating
laws.
Additionally, some scholars argue for a flexible approach to
nondelegation, in which the original meaning of the Constitution
supports a strict application of the doctrine in most cases, but
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Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. at 1246 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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does not apply to “certain selected parts of the law.”139 Others
argue that the test for delegation should be whether the
delegated authority relates to a matter of basic importance or is
ancillary to the statutory scheme.140 However, these approaches
to nondelegation are still too ambiguous and can lead to inconsist
applications. Allowing the executive branch the discretion to
implement ancillary matters of a statute but not matters of basic
importance raises the questions as to what matters will be
defined as ancillary and what matters will be defined as of basic
importance. Those terms better align with the current ambiguity
already allowed in nondelegation jurisprudence, and therefore
any nondelegation analysis would look similar to the current
practice of the Court allowing ambiguity to stand in favor of
efficiency. The new three-part standard does not distinguish
between matters, but instead takes the position that all
delegation of legislative authority must be measured uniformly,
with the focus being whether Congress was specific enough in
describing the amount of power the agency can exercise.
Professor David Schoenbrod believes that “[t]he test of
permissible delegation should look not to what quantity of power
a statute confers but to what kind . . . .”141 Schoenbrod argues
that “the statute itself must speak to what people cannot do; the
statute may not merely recite regulatory goals and leave it to an
agency to promulgate the rules to achieve those goals.”142 While
the new three-part standard incorporates Schoenbrod’s idea that
Congress cannot simply recite goals that agencies are free to
create rules to achieve, the new standard differs from Schoenbrod
because it does not require Congress to state exactly what the
agencies cannot do. Instead, if Congress does not explicitly grant
authority to an agency, it is presumed not to have the ability to
promulgate in that area. Since the goal of the intelligible
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principle is to minimize the discretionary power exercised by
agencies and uphold the separation of powers consistent with the
original meaning of nondelegation, if Congress were required to
state everything that an agency cannot do, anything Congress
did not exclude could be interpreted as a presumptive delegation
to the agency. The third requirement of the new intelligible
principle prevents this interpretation by ensuring that an agency
does not get the benefit of the doubt when Congress does not
speak to a certain issue in the statute.
Finally, there have recently been calls for a heightened
intelligible principle standard by simply reversing the Chevron
presumption that ambiguity within a statute equals
By reversing this presumption,
congressional delegation.143
“courts would hold that delegation could only take place
narrowly—when Congress has clearly delineated the standard
that it intends the agency to achieve.”144 However, while
reversing the Chevron presumption of administrative deference
would certainly be a means of eliminating an agency’s ability to
create its own interpretations of statutes, it would “merely shift
discretion from the independent agency to the reviewing
court . . . to determine when Congress has or has not spoken
authoritatively.”145 This still leaves the potential for courts to
uphold broad statutory language, something that the intelligible
principle is meant to prevent. Therefore, built into the third part
of the new standard is not only a call for the reversal of Chevron
deference, but also a call for Congress to directly address any
ambiguity of whether or not the agency has authority to act on a
particular issue, instead of relying on the Court to determine
Congress’ intent.
Ultimately, the new intelligible principle is a viable standard
for nondelegation cases because it is multi-dimensional,
requiring courts to give a comprehensive examination of what
exactly Congress has delegated to an agency. Should the Court
adopt this new intelligible principle standard, it will be a
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See Casazza, supra note 36, at 755–56.
Id. at 756. Casazza goes on to say that under this new approach, “[T]he
delegation in J.W. Hampton, which required only calculation and adjustment of a
tariff based on fluctuating prices, would stand while the delegation in Whitman,
which asked the agency to restrict pollutants to the level ‘requisite to protect public
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significant step towards maintaining accountability and the
separation of powers doctrine that are central to the
nondelegation doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The nondelegation doctrine stands as the foundation of the
United States Constitution’s Vesting Clause, and the intelligible
principle standard was intended to give the United States
Supreme Court power to uphold the doctrine and its
Constitutional underpinnings. But over the last eighty years, the
standard has crumbled, allowing Congress “to avoid hard
choices” by passing the legislative responsibility to
administrative agencies that do not derive their authority from
the consent of the public.146 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
shown that the intelligible principle is little more than a speed
bump that Congress must pass over on its way to delegating
essentially unrestricted legislative authority, effectually
undermining the purposes of the nondelegation doctrine and the
separation of powers. The new three-part intelligible principle
attempts to bring the standard as close as possible to its
constitutional roots while simultaneously ensuring that the
government can still function in today’s complex administrative
state.
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